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Muni trains, which operate manually above ground, switch to an Automated Train Control System (ATCS) when traveling through the Market Street Subway; a practice which has been in place since the late 1990s. When operating in automatic mode the Motorman has no control over the movement of the vehicle, but still cycles the doors at each station and makes necessary announcements.
Muni Transit Director John Haley reaffirmed his support of the automated system while attempting to squash concerns about passenger safety. Haley said “I think the point here is the train was under control by the automatic train control system at all times. The system worked the way it was designed.”
And that is where Director Haley is wrong.
While Muni’s ATCS was designed to remove human involvement from the running of trains underground, humans were never intended to be removed from the operation of trains underground.
As far as safety is concerned Muni Motormen serve an important purpose in the subway by acting as the eyes and ears of the blind and deaf SelTrac ATCS. Should the ATCS fail to brake properly or if an obstruction were to block the tracks, the Operator onboard is instructed to use the emergency brake to stop the vehicle and protect passengers.
Although Muni insists the ATCS is effective both with – and apparently without – a Motorman, the concerns over automatic train control are ones that shouldn’t be ignored.
When Muni first introduced the SelTrac ATCS in 1998 it was plagued with problems. These problems including trains that bypassed stations, trains that followed the wrong route, and trains that went into emergency for no reason at all.
Despite expensive software upgrades and years of tinkering, the ATCS is still one of the bay area transit authority’s biggest headaches.
A review of Muni’s on-time performance in 2010 found that metro trains failed to connect to the ATCS more than 200 times every month, each time grinding service in the Market Street Subway to a halt.
These service crippling computer glitches have generated a colloquialism in San Francisco over the past decade. They call it a “Muni Meltdown”.
While computer glitches that stop service may be an annoyance, other ATCS glitches around the world have caused injury and loss of life.
Two separate accidents in Beijing in 2011 injured a combined 450 people and killed 39 when newly implemented computerized train control systems failed to stop two trains from hitting stationary ones in front of them.
San Francisco’s other automated subway system, BART, has also had a series of incidents regarding their computerized controls; including a test train that ran off the rails and into a parking lot.
The most high profile accident regarding automatic train control was the 2009 DC Metro crash. The accident, which claimed 9 lives, was caused when the ATCS failed to recognize the train in front of it sending the striking train into a stopped train at full speed. A similar accident occurred on the Metro in 1996 resulting in the death of the train Operator.
As part of a safety agreement between ATU Local 689 and the WMATA the DC Metro has been run manually since the 2009 crash.
While proponents of computerized train control systems can point out accidents caused by Motormen on manually controlled subway and rail systems there is an enormous difference between the two.
An accident caused by a Motorman in manual control can be corrected through progressive discipline or retraining, and can be used as a teachable example to other Motormen to avoid a similar accident in the future.
An accident caused by a glitch in a thoughtless, heartless, and inanimate computer system cannot be predicted, cannot be corrected, and cannot be prevented.
Susan Moore, a passenger on the driverless train, perfectly summed up what it was like to be on that train. In an interview with San Francisco’s ABC-7 she described her and her fellow passengers’ concerns. “We didn’t know if a train was going to come up…” Moore said “For Muni to make light of it was really upsetting, because… You weren’t there”.
The blind faith that Director Haley and Muni have placed in their ATCS is emblematic of the over reliance our 21st century society has placed on technology.
This editorial was written and edited by Dan Lampariello & Scott Page
When Muni first introduced the SelTrac ATCS in 1998 it was plagued with problems. These problems including trains that bypassed stations, trains that followed the wrong route, and trains that went into emergency for no reason at all.
Despite expensive software upgrades and years of tinkering, the ATCS is still one of the bay area transit authority’s biggest headaches.
A review of Muni’s on-time performance in 2010 found that metro trains failed to connect to the ATCS more than 200 times every month, each time grinding service in the Market Street Subway to a halt.
These service crippling computer glitches have generated a colloquialism in San Francisco over the past decade. They call it a “Muni Meltdown”.
While computer glitches that stop service may be an annoyance, other ATCS glitches around the world have caused injury and loss of life.
Two separate accidents in Beijing in 2011 injured a combined 450 people and killed 39 when newly implemented computerized train control systems failed to stop two trains from hitting stationary ones in front of them.
San Francisco’s other automated subway system, BART, has also had a series of incidents regarding their computerized controls; including a test train that ran off the rails and into a parking lot.
The most high profile accident regarding automatic train control was the 2009 DC Metro crash. The accident, which claimed 9 lives, was caused when the ATCS failed to recognize the train in front of it sending the striking train into a stopped train at full speed. A similar accident occurred on the Metro in 1996 resulting in the death of the train Operator.
As part of a safety agreement between ATU Local 689 and the WMATA the DC Metro has been run manually since the 2009 crash.
While proponents of computerized train control systems can point out accidents caused by Motormen on manually controlled subway and rail systems there is an enormous difference between the two.
An accident caused by a Motorman in manual control can be corrected through progressive discipline or retraining, and can be used as a teachable example to other Motormen to avoid a similar accident in the future.
An accident caused by a glitch in a thoughtless, heartless, and inanimate computer system cannot be predicted, cannot be corrected, and cannot be prevented.
Susan Moore, a passenger on the driverless train, perfectly summed up what it was like to be on that train. In an interview with San Francisco’s ABC-7 she described her and her fellow passengers’ concerns. “We didn’t know if a train was going to come up…” Moore said “For Muni to make light of it was really upsetting, because… You weren’t there”.
The blind faith that Director Haley and Muni have placed in their ATCS is emblematic of the over reliance our 21st century society has placed on technology.
This editorial was written and edited by Dan Lampariello & Scott Page